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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS
Action To Recover Earnest Money Deposit
Cusack v. DeWitt-Jenkins Realty Co.' involved an action by pur-
chasers against a real estate broker to recover a $500 deposit made in
connection with the purchase of realty. Purchasers alleged that the broker
had orally agreed to refund the deposit in the event of purchaser's failure
to secure financing. It was further alleged that neither plaintiffs for
themselves, nor the sellers for them, were able to obtain financing; that
after such discovery plaintiffs demanded of the defendant-broker the re-
turn of the deposit, and defendant agreed if plaintiffs would procure from
the seller (the client of the broker) a written release from liability; that
plaintiffs secured the release, showed it to defendant, and again demanded
the return of the deposit, but that defendant refused to return the money.
The defendant-broker, answering, admitted that it negotiated a sales
agreement between the plaintiffs and the seller, but denied having agreed
to refund the deposit money, and specifically pleaded a provision of the
sales agreement between the seller and the plaintiffs which provided:
... that there are no agreements ... binding on any of the contracting
parties hereto, or their brokers, except as herein contained. Specific refer-
ence is made to the fact that neither the seller, the broker, nor the salesman
associated with the broker, has agreed to finance or procure the financing
of any part of the purchase price except as written herein, nor shall any
effort on the part of the seller, the broker, or the salesman, to procure for
the purchaser the financing of any part of the purchase price be construed
as a waiver herein.2
From a judgment for the plaintiff-purchasers, the defendant appealed.
Defendant argued that the court erred in not recognizing the above as-
sertion in the sales agreement as a contract between the plaintiffs and the
sellers for the benefit of a third party, the broker; and that, as such, it
precluded a judgment against the said third party beneficiary. The court
of appeals, in affirming the judgment of the lower court, held that the
language fell far short of creating a third party beneficiary contract; that
it was only a declaration of fact in a contract on a different subject mat-
ter which did not imply a promise to do anything for a third party
an essential element of a third party beneficiary contract.
Reese v. Walker also involved a suit by prospective purchasers of
realty for the return of their earnest money deposit. The purchase con-
tract provided that it was "contingent upon securing necessary financing."
1. 149 N.E.2d 924 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957).
2. Id. at 926.
3. 151 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1958).
Uune
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
Purchasers attempted to obtain a loan. They were able to secure a com-
mitment for the amount they felt they needed, but not on the terms they
felt they could meet. In an excellent opinion, the Municipal Court of
Cincinnati reasoned that "necessary financing' means more than simply
the face amount of a loan. It includes a loan on terms the borrower can
repay; that only the purchaser can determine what financing he needs;
and as long as he honestly determines the kind of a loan he needs and
makes a bona fide effort to obtain it, the seller cannot complain. The
court found that the buyers met this standard of good faith, and accord-
ingly rule'd that since the condition precedent to consummation of the
contract was impossible of fulfillment, the contract was terminated and
the buyers were entitled to a return of their earnest money deposit.
Inconsistency Between Printed and
Handwritten Parts of Contract
In Botzum Bros. v. Brown Lumber Co.4 it was held that where there
is an inconsistency between the printed portion of a contract and the
handwritten specifications, inserted at the time the agreement was exe-
cuted, the handwritten portion of the contract controls.
Work To Be Done To Other Party's Satisfaction:
Objective Standard Applied
Whenever one party under a contract must perform to the "satisfac-
tion" of the other, the question arises whether an objective or a subjective
standard is to be applied in judging the performance. In Enterprise
Roofing & S. M. Co. v. Howard Invest. Corp.,5 where, under a contract
for repair of a building, the contractor was to perform to the satisfaction
of the defendant, the court adopted the objective standard, stating that the
defendant "was required to appraise the work as a reasonable man would
do." This is in line with the weight of authority elsewhere in the
United States; the subjective standard being applied only in contracts in-
volving aesthetic taste, art, or personal judgment 7
Plant Superintendent's Covenant
Not To Compete Enforced
Summarily, a covenant restricting competition is valid if, under all
the circumstances, it is reasonable.8  In Conforming Matrix Corp. v.
4. 150 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio Cr. App. 1957).
5. 152 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
6. Id. a 810.
7. See CoRBIN, CoNTRACrs § 644 et seq. (1950).
8. Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942).
19591
